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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes or rules determinative of or 
pertinent to the issues presented for review is contained in the body of this reply brief, Doms' 
opening brief, or the addenda. 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In their response brief, Plaintiffs erroneously assert that Doms' opening brief misstates the 
standards of appellate review in regard to Doms' six major issues as Cross-Appellant. However, 
Plaintiffs fail to point out a single instance in w lilch the standards set foi th I, -. >ms' opening 
brief are incorrect. Contrary to Plaintiffs' assertions, issues 1, 3, 5 and 6 do present arguments 
based primarily on questions of law, and in some instances, mixed questions of law and fact. 
Issues 2 and 4 clearly present questions of law only. 
Plaintiffs have also attempted to set up a smoke screen by inappropriately categorizing 
Doms' arguments as ihalltMif.'iiig tlir liu! aniif » Mmlin^ of Vncf \« mil U- piiiiilul1 uui m 
detail, infra, Doms is challenging the trial court's legal rulings and Conclusions of Law in regard 
to Doms' issues, not the Findings of Fact. Plaintiffs are attempting to place upon Doms the 
heavy burden of marshaling all of the evidence in support of the Findings of Fact and 
demonstrating they are clearly erroneous. Doms has not failed to marshal the evidence 
supporting the trial court's Findings of Fact because Doms is not challenging the Findings of 
Fact. In each of the six points, infra, it will be established that the trial court committed errors 
of law, itiitl lis i,om (tistoiiN mil Law and Jinlginrnt air no( syphoned by us own Findings ot Fad 
and the uncontradicted evidence in the record. 
Plaintiffs also erroneously assert that Doms has misstated relevant facts in his "Statement 
of Facts/' This is another totally baseless assertion by Plaintiffs, who subsequently fail to point 
1 
out a single instance where any of the facts set forth in Doms' opening brief are incorrect. On 
the contrary, every fact set forth under Doms' "Statement of Facts" and throughout his opening 
brief is either a direct Finding of Fact by the trial court or is based upon uncontradicted evidence 
in the record. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY 
APPLYING THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINE OF LACHES AND 
REFUSING TO RESCIND THE ROSSI HILLS TRANSACTION, 
A. Doms has not challenged the trial court's pertinent Findings of Fact regarding 
rescission and laches as clearly erroneous. 
In Point I of their response brief as Cross-Appellees, Plaintiffs set forth, in whole or in 
part, 12 of the 15 Findings of Fact by the trial court regarding the issues of Doms' right to 
rescission of the Rossi Hills transaction and application of the doctrine of laches.1 Findings of 
Fact 33-47 are the 15 Findings of Fact originally set forth in the trial court's Memorandum 
Decision denying rescission on the basis of laches (R. 4188-95; Add. 21 to Doms' op. br.). 
After setting forth 12 of these Findings of Fact (and conveniently omitting several other 
pertinent Findings of Fact), Plaintiffs make the baseless, blanket assertion that Doms' arguments 
regarding his right to rescission are attacks on these Findings of the trial court, and are supported 
only be evidence which is contradictory to these Findings. Plaintiffs then conclude their 
erroneous argument with the assertion that the trial court's ruling denying rescission should be 
1
 All arguments and references in this reply brief to the arguments of Plaintiffs are to 
Points I-VI of Plaintiffs' response brief as Cross-Appellees. References in parentheses to 
Doms' opening brief are abbreviated "op. br." References to Findings of Fact (F. of F.), 
Conclusions of Law (C. of L.), and Judgment (Judg.) are to the trial court's final Second 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 6874-99; Add. 1 to Doms' op. br.) 
and Second Amended Judgment (R. 6900-07; Add. 2 to Doms' op. br.). 
2 
affirmed because Doms has not marshaled the evidence to demonstrate the trial court's Findings 
of Fact are clearly erroneous. 
Plaintiffs' argument is a subterfuge and fails for the obvious reason that Doms has not 
challenged the trial court's pertinent Findings of Fact regarding rescission and laches. In Point 
I of his opening brief, Doms argues that he is entitled to rescission of the Rossi Hills transaction 
notwithstanding the trial court's Findings of Fact regarding Doms' knowledge of the loop road 
and other encroachments on the property prior to the sale in March of 1982. Contrary to their 
unsubstantiated assertions, Plaintiffs have failed to point out a single specific Finding of Fact 
which Doms is alleged °laintiffs pointed out a single piece of evidence 
which Plaintiffs allege should have been marshaled. Furthermore, Plaintiffs have failed to point 
out a single piece of evidence relied upon by Doms which contradicts the pertinent Findings of 
Fact by the trial court regarding rescission and laches. 
B. The trial court's pertinent Findings of Fact and the uncontradicted evidence establish 
Poms' right to rescission and preclude application of laches. 
Findings of Fact 33-39 are based on uncontradicted evidence in the record, and Doms 
does not challenge any of these Findings. Furthermore, none of these seven Findings of Fact 
relate directly to application of the doctrine of laches against Doms, except for Finding of Fact 
35. which Plaintiffs conveniently fail to discuss. In Finding of Fact 35, the trial court found as 
follows: 
35. Both Sloan and Anderson represented that the property was a prime piece 
of development property and its highest and best use would be as an integrated 
development with the two adjoining parcels referred to as Block 62 and the 
Slipper parcel. 
It is readily apparent why Plaintiffs ignore Finding of Fact 35. These were 
misrepresentations ml muteiMl latts lb) In I Aiidnisnii antdl Ms agent, Mikr Sluan, which Doins 
relied upon and induced him to purchase Rossi Hills. The uncontradicted evidence in the record 
3 
establishes that Anderson and Sloan either intentionally or negligently failed to tell Doms that 
Plaintiffs' attempts at the three-parcel development had previously failed because the owners of 
Block 62 felt there were legal encumbrances on Rossi Hills which would prevent development 
of a significant portion of the property (R. 7437-38, 7481-82, 7484, 7593-94, 7603-04). The 
uncontradicted evidence also establishes that Plaintiffs and Sloan failed to tell Doms that the 
three-parcel development had already been submitted for preliminary approval to Park City and 
rejected (R. 7556). The uncontradicted evidence also establishes that the proposed three-parcel 
development could not have been built under the Park City ordinances in effect at that time, but 
Sloan and D.C. Anderson told Doms that the development could be built (R. 7417-18, 7617). 
Plaintiffs and Sloan were well aware of the loop road and encroachments on Rossi Hills when 
they sold it to Doms (F. of F. 14) and, in fact, D.C. Anderson and Dan Scott had owned Rossi 
Hills for approximately 16 years prior to this time (R. 2724, pp. 21-24). 
These material misrepresentations and others are set forth with particularity on pages 21-
22 of Doms' opening brief. Thus, the uncontradicted evidence in the record clearly establishes 
that the representations made by Sloan and Anderson in Finding of Fact 35 were false, and that 
Sloan and Anderson either knew or should have known that these representations were false. 
Rossi Hills was not a "prime piece of development property," and the integrated development 
with Block 62 and the Slipper parcel had already fallen apart because of the position taken by 
the Block 62 principals regarding the encroachments on the property. 
Another absolutely critical Finding of Fact by the trial court which supports Doms' right 
to rescission and precludes application of the doctrine of laches against Doms is Finding of Fact 
42. This Finding is also completely ignored by Plaintiffs. In Finding of Fact 42, the trial court 
found as follows: 
4 
42. Mr. Sloan informed Defendant Doms that the encroachments would not 
affect development and an access road to the property would be in the same place 
as the loop road. 
This Finding by the trial court is based on the testimony of Sloan himself at trial (R. 
7668, 7683-84). The representation by Sloan to Doms that the encroachments would not affect 
development of the property is an undisputable misrepresentation of a material fact, which Doms 
relied upon and induced him to purchase Rossi Hills. 
Plaintiffs argue that the above-mentioned misrepresentations, and those additional 
misrepresentations set forth on pages 21-22 of Doms' opening brief, do not "rise to the level" of 
being "material misrepresentations." However, this statement is the sum total of Plaintiffs' entire 
argument in regard to these misrepresentations. Plaintiffs do not present a single argument to 
support their unsubstantiated assertion, 
A "material fact" is one "which a buyer or seller of ordinary intelligence and prudence 
would think to be of some importance in determining whether to buy or sell." S&F Supply Co. 
v. Hunter. 527 P.2d 217, 221 (Utah 1974). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 162(2). The misrepresentations by D.C. Anderson and Sloan set forth in Findings of Fact 35 
and 4.1, and those set forth on pages 21-22 of Doms' opening brief, are cleai ly misrepresentations 
of facts which a buyer of ordinary intelligence and prudence would think to be of some 
importance in determining whether to buy. Therefore, these misrepresentations constitute 
misrepresentations of material facts, and Plaintiffs' unsubstantiated assertion to the contrary is 
clearly erroneous. 
In Finding of Fact 40, the trial court concluded as follows: 
40. Doms knew or should have known at the time he purchased the Rossie 
[sic] Hills Property and the Slipper parcel that the integrated development of the 
three parcels had failed because of the problems with the Rossie [sic J Hills 
5 
property and the inability of the parties to reach an agreement as to credits for 
each parcel 
In Gillmor v. Wright. 850 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme Court set forth 
the following standard: 
On appeal, we disregard the labels attached to findings and conclusions and look 
to the substance, (citations omitted). Therefore, that which a trial court labels a 
"finding of fact" may be in actuality a conclusion of law, which we review for 
correctness, (citations omitted). 
The trial court's statement in Finding of Fact 40 that Doms knew or should have known 
why Plaintiffs' attempt at the three-parcel development had failed is a Conclusion of Law, not 
a true Finding of Fact. Furthermore, it is an erroneous Conclusion of Law based upon the trial 
court's opinion that it was "unbelievable" that Doms did not investigate and determine exactly 
why Plaintiffs had not concluded the three-parcel development (see pp. 4-5 of Memorandum 
Decision denying rescission; Add. 21 to Doms' op. br.). 
This opinion demonstrates the trial court's misunderstanding of Utah law. Doms had no 
legal obligation to make such an investigation. On the contrary, Doms was entitled to rely on 
the positive assertions by Anderson and Sloan regarding Rossi Hills and its development potential 
with Block 62 and the Slipper parcel. Dugan v. Jones. 615 P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1980); 
Despain v. Despain. 855 P.2d 254,257 (Utah App. 1993). The trial court's own Findings of Fact 
35 and 42, and the uncontradicted evidence in the record, establish that Doms did not know at 
the time he purchased Rossi Hills and the Slipper parcel that the three-parcel development had 
failed due to the "problems" with the property because Anderson and Sloan had duped and 
deceived Doms by telling him there were no problems. 
Sloan, as a licensed real estate broker and agent, breached his duty under Utah law to 
disclose material facts to Doms; and Sloan's failure to tell Doms that the three-parcel 
development had previously failed because of the encroachments on Rossi Hills constitutes a 
6 
material misrepresentation. Dugan v. Jones, supra, at 615 P.2d 1248.2 Moreover, Doms had a 
right under Utah law to repose confidence in Sloan's competence, knowledge and honesty in 
regard to Rossi Hills. Id. 
In Findings of Fact 41 and 43, the trial court found as follows: 
41. Doms walked the Rossie [sic] Hills property with Mr. Sloan in the fall of 
1981 and knew that there were roads and sheds on the property. 
43. Doms had actual notice of the easement encroachments for the first time 
sometime between October 22, 1981, and November 7, 1981, and had further 
notice during 1982 and up and through 1984. 
Findings of Fact 41 and 43 are based solely on Sloan's testimony that he walked the 
property with Doms in October or November of 1981 (R. 7650-68). Contrary to Plaintiffs' 
assertions. Doms does not challenge these Findings on appeal.3 
Finding of Fact 43 may need some clarification so that there will be no misunderstanding 
in regard to the actual findings of the trial court. The trial court's use of the term "easement 
encroachments" in Finding of Fact 43 does not mean, and was not intended to mean, that Doms 
2
 See also Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790, 795 (Utah 1986); First Security Bank v. 
Banberrv Development. 786 P.2d 1326, 1329-33 (Utah 1990). 
3
 Doms argued to the trial court that Sloan's testimony in this regard was false, 
inherently unbelievable, and that Sloan was either mistaken or simply did not tell the truth 
(see Doms' "Trial Brief Regarding Issue of Laches" (R. 5101-42; Add. 22 to Doms' op. br.)). 
Doms repeatedly testified at trial that although he viewed the general area of Rossi Hills from 
some distance in the late fall of 1981, there was snow on the ground at that time, and he did 
not walk nor personally inspect the property with Sloan or anyone else prior to the closing 
which occurred in March of 1982 (R. 7144-45, 7147, 7294, 7427-30, 7449-51, 7688-89). 
Sloan's testimony at trial in regard to walking the property with Doms and what he allegedly 
told Doms at that time was inconsistent and/or contradictory to his deposition testimony (R. 
454). Moreover, Sloan admitted in his testimony at trial that it was possible he was mistaken 
and that he could have walked the property with one of several other people at that time 
rather than Doms (R. 7680). However, because of the deference accorded to the finder of 
fact to determine the credibility of witnesses, Doms is not challenging Findings of Fact 41 
and 43. Doms' argument on appeal is that he is entitled to rescission of the Rossi Hills 
transaction notwithstanding these Findings of Fact by the trial court. 
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had knowledge or actual notice of the encroachments as legal prescriptive easements or 
encumbrances. In all of its other Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court 
scrupulously avoided the use of the word "easement" or the term "prescriptive easement," but 
rather utilized the word "encroachment." In fact, on page 2 of the trial court's Memorandum 
Decision of August 7, 1991 (R. 5325-28), the trial court specifically ordered that the words 
"prescriptive easement" be deleted from Conclusion of Law No. 2 and the word "encroachment" 
be inserted in its place. 
Moreover, an interpretation of Finding of Fact 43 to mean that Doms had actual notice 
of prescriptive easements on the property in the fall of 1981 would contradict the trial court's 
own Conclusion of Law 34 (see Point I. C, infra). In addition, there is not one scintilla of 
evidence which would support a finding that Doms had actual notice of any legally recognized 
prescriptive easements on the property before he purchased it. All of the uncontradicted 
evidence, including the trial court's own Findings of Fact 35 and 42, clearly establish that Doms 
did not have any such knowledge or notice. 
Plaintiffs fail to set forth and discuss several other pertinent Findings of Fact made by the 
trial court. Findings of Fact 14 and 15 establish that Plaintiffs knew about all of the 
encroachments, yet made no effort to remove or extinguish them. Findings of Fact 44 and 45 
establish that Doms gave notice of his intent to rescind in January of 1985, and that Plaintiffs 
ignored Doms' settlement offer and filed their foreclosure action in June of 1985. 
Plaintiffs attack Finding of Fact 44, in which the trial court found that Doms gave notice 
of his intent to rescind in January of 1985, without marshaling any evidence in support of this 
Finding. In so doing, Plaintiffs are guilty of the very failure that they have falsely asserted 
against Doms. All of the uncontradicted evidence in the record, including the very detailed 
testimony of attorney Jerry Kinghorn in regard to this issue, supports this Finding. 
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Plaintiffs also erroneously argue that Doms' tender of rescission in January of 1985 was 
not a valid offer to rescind because Doms allegedly did not own the property. At that time, 
Rossi Hills had been conveyed by warranty deed to Domcoy to facilitate the three-parcel 
development. Doms was the chief financial officer and secretary of Domcoy, and had the clear 
corporate authority to make a rescission offer and tender the property back to Plaintiffs pursuant 
to the By-Laws of Domcoy and the First Meeting of the Board of Directors of Domcoy (Exs. 
32P, 38P; R. 7185, 7202). Furthermore, the uncontradicted testimony of Kinghorn, legal counsel 
for Domcoy, establishes that "Doms was Domcoy at that time" and "continues to be to this day" 
(R. 7517-20). Domcoy had become the "alter ego" of Doms, and Domcoy was merely the "bare 
legal title holder" of Rossi Hills for Doms, who was the equitable owner.4 
The trial court's Findings of Fact and the uncontradicted evidence establish that Plaintiffs' 
misrepresentations and non-disclosures of material facts, upon which Doms reasonably relied, 
induced Doms to purchase Rossi Hills and continue his efforts to develop the property as part 
of the three-parcel development.5 Any alleged delay by Doms in seeking rescission was the 
direct result of the intentional or negligent misrepresentations by Plaintiffs. 
4
 See Belnap v. Blain. 575 P.2d 696, 699 (Utah 1978); Barlow Society v. Commercial 
Security Bank, 723 P.2d 398, 401 (Utah 1986). 
5
 Contrary to Plaintiffs' erroneous assertion, Doms never "abandoned" his causes of 
action for fraud and misrepresentation. The trial court simply indicated in open court that it 
was going to rule against Doms on these causes of action, and Doms therefore rested his case 
in regard to these issues. Doms' argument on appeal is that he is entitled to rescission or 
damages as a remedy for Plaintiffs' negligent or intentional misrepresentations. The standard 
of proof for Doms' cause of action for misrepresentation is a preponderance of evidence, 
rather than the clear and convincing evidence required to prove common law fraud. Baldwin 
v. Vantage Corp., 676 P.2d 413, 417 (Utah 1984). The trial court's Conclusion of Law 41 
and paragraph 15 of the Judgment, insofar as they reject Doms' misrepresentation claim, are 
contradicted by the Findings of Fact and the evidence in the record. These rulings are in 
error and should be reversed. 
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In subpoints C and D of Point I of his opening brief, Doms sets forth with particularly 
the uncontradicted facts, totally consistent with the trial court's Findings of Fact, which preclude 
application of the equitable doctrine of laches against Doms. Doms acted promptly to rescind 
after obtaining knowledge, through diligent efforts, that there were legal encumbrances on Rossi 
Hills; and up to that time Doms diligently attempted to continue to develop the property and 
thereby mitigate damages. Doms cites relevant language from the factually analogous case 
decided by this Court in Breuer-Hanison. Inc. v. Combe. 799 P.2d 716 (Utah App. 1990), which 
is controlling and should determine the outcome of the instant case. 
In their response brief, Plaintiffs misinterpret Breuer-Harrison and fail to address the 
controlling language and reasoning as set forth in Doms' opening brief. In Breuer-Harrison. like 
the instant case, the buyers walked the subject property with the sellers' real estate agent prior 
to tneir purchase. 799 P.2d at 719. The sellers' agent, like Plaintiffs' agent, Sloan, in regard to 
the encroachments on Rossi Hills in the instant case, was aware of what he termed a "water line" 
prior to the sale of the property, "but considered it only a minor impediment to the development 
of the property for housing units." Id. at 724. The buyers did not leam that this water line was 
an easement and constituted a legal encumbrance on the subject property until some four years 
after their purchase. Id. Although the buyers talked with the sellers approximately one year later 
about rescinding the contract as an option, the buyers did not seek rescission until some four 
years after they learned of the pipeline easement. Id. at 722, 726. 
In the instant case, Doms immediately sought rescission after obtaining knowledge, 
through his diligent efforts and those of Kinghom, that there were legal encumbrances on Rossi 
Hills. In Breuer-Harrison. this Court affirmed the summary judgment of the trial court granting 
rescission to the buyers and rejecting the sellers' laches claim, because the buyers were diligent 
in ascertaining the complete impact of the pipeline easement and continued to attempt to develop 
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the property around the easement and thereby mitigate damages. Id. at 726-27. The holding and 
reasoning of this Court in Breuer-Harrison are a fortiori applicable to the instant case and 
preclude application of laches against Doms.6 
On pages 13-16 of their response brief, Plaintiffs mistakenly rely on Erisman v. Overman. 
358 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah 1961); Perry v. Woodall 438 P.2d 813, 815 (Utah 1968); Tavlor v. 
Moore, 51 P.2d 222, 227 (Utah 1935); and Thompson on Real Property § 4465. These three 
cases and the single secondary authority simply stand for the proposition that in order to rescind 
a contract because of alleged fraud or misrepresentation, a buyer must act within a reasonable 
time after he has become aware of the fraud or misrepresentation and discovers the falsity of the 
statements on which he relied. 
In the instant case, once Doms learned the truth about the encroachments on Rossi Hills, 
through his own diligent efforts, and discovered the falsity of Plaintiffs' representations regarding 
Rossi Hills and the encroachments, Doms immediately sought rescission of the Rossi Hills 
transaction. The cases and authority cited by Plaintiffs simply reinforce Doms' right to rescission 
and preclude application of the doctrine of laches. 
As part of their erroneous argument that Doms did not act promptly to rescind, Plaintiffs 
allege on page 15 that "Doms continued to make payments under the contract for approximately 
six years." This assertion by Plaintiffs is patently false. Doms made payments on Rossi Hills 
under the contract from April of 1982 to December of 1984, a period of approximately two years 
and seven months (see Ex. 6P; Add. 7 to Doms' op. br.). Furthermore, once Doms learned that 
6
 The Utah Supreme Court has recently held that when one panel of the Court of 
Appeals is faced with a prior decision of a different panel, the doctrine of stare decisis has 
equal application, although the doctrine is typically thought of as applying to a single-panel 
appellate court. State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993). Thus, Doms' right to 
rescission and rejection of Plaintiffs' laches claim in the instant case should be considered a 
matter of stare decisis. 
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he had been deceived by Plaintiffs, he demanded rescission and refused to make the principal 
payment of $194,250.00 purportedly due under the terms of the trust deed note. 
In addition to failing to establish the first element of laches, an unreasonable delay or lack 
of diligence, Plaintiffs failed in the trial court and have failed on appeal to establish the second 
element of laches, an identifiable injury or prejudice owing to an unreasonable delay or lack of 
diligence. As set forth in Point I E. of Poms' opening brief. Plaintiffs presented no evidence at 
trial to show that they had been injured or prejudiced bv any alleged unreasonable delay, and 
based upon this complete lack of evidence, the trial court did not enter any Findings of Fact or 
Conclusions of Law that Plaintiffs had suffered injury or prejudice. 
On pages 16-17 of their response brief, Plaintiffs now desperately attempt to establish the 
second element of laches by arguing that evidence was presented that the value of Rossi Hills 
had "depreciated to about 37% of the original value by the time of the action." The same 
argument of a plummeting real estate market and substantially decreased real estate values was 
made by the sellers in Breuer-Harrison. supra, and was categorically rejected bv this Court. 799 
P.2d at 726-27. 
In addition, Plaintiffs' assertion is inaccurate and not supported by their citation to the 
record (R. 7825, 7937). These record citations are to a couple of statements made by Jerry 
Webber, the expert real estate appraiser retained and called by Doms as a witness. These 
statements were made in the second part of the bifurcated trial on August 21, 1990, four months 
after the trial court had already issued its Memorandum Decision applying laches and denying 
rescission on April 30, 1990 (R. 4188-95; Add. 21 to Doms' op. br.). Whether or not Plaintiffs 
were injured or prejudiced was not at issue and was never argued in the second part of the 
bifurcated trial regarding damages. 
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Furthermore, Plaintiffs' assertion regarding the decrease in value of Rossi HiDs is not 
supported by Webber's cited testimony. Webber simply testified that "between 1983 and 1988 
there was a significant decrease in value" of property in the Park City area, and that land values 
had declined at a rate of near 15% per year over the last eight years (R. 7825, 7937). Plaintiffs' 
assertion that Rossi Hills had depreciated to about 37% of its original value is fallacious and 
totally unsubstantiated. 
In Point I. F of his opening brief, Doms establishes that Plaintiffs have acted in bad faith 
and come into Court with "unclean hands." In response, Plaintiffs assert that Doms knew the 
truth of all of Plaintiffs' misrepresentations either before or shortly after he purchased Rossi Hills. 
Plaintiffs' argument is clearly erroneous and has been fully addressed above. 
C. The trial court's Conclusions of Law denying rescission are legally incorrect and not 
supported by the pertinent Findings of Fact and the uncontradicted evidence. 
The trial court entered the following Conclusions of Law denying rescission of the Rossi 
Hills transaction: 
33. In regard to the issue of whether or not Defendant Doms was entitled to 
rescind the contract, the Court concludes that Defendant Doms was bound to take 
remedial action after the Fall of 1981 which the Court determined to be the date 
he was made aware of the encroachments and loop road, and which was prior to 
the purchase of the Slipper parcel. 
34. It was not necessary for Defendant Doms to obtain a legal opinion that 
the loop road was a prescriptive easement or that the shed and fences had a legal 
basis for being on the Rossie [sic] Hills Property before he could make his tender 
to rescind. 
35. Once Defendant Doms knew of the road and encumbrances, he should 
have taken action within a reasonable time to notify the sellers of his intent to 
rescind the transaction. 
39. Defendant Doms did not act within a reasonable time after he obtained 
knowledge that the loop road and the encroachments were upon the Rossie [sic] 
Hills Property. 
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40. The Court concludes that Defendant Doms waited an unreasonable amount 
of time to seek rescission; therefore, rescission is not the appropriate remedy in 
this case and is barred by the doctrine of laches. 
The trial court's Conclusions of Law are to be reviewed by this Court for legal 
correctness, with no deference to the trial court's rulings.7 The initial and critical errors of law 
made by the trial court, upon which the remaining Conclusions of Law denying rescission are 
based, are contained in Conclusions of Law 33 and 34. In Conclusion of Law 33, the trial court 
ruled that Doms was bound to seek rescission after the fall of 1981, which was some four months 
before Doms purchased Rossi Hills. This ruling by the trial court demonstrates the court's 
confusion of the facts and misunderstanding of Utah law regarding rescission and laches. 
Conclusion of Law 33 further emphasizes that Doms was bound to seek rescission prior to his 
purchase of an interest in the Slipper parcel. This ruling bv the trial court is directly contradicted 
by the trial court's own Findings of Fact 36 through 38. in which the trial court found that Doms 
purchased an interest in the Slipper parcel to further development of the three parcels as an 
integrated development. Thus, the trial court's conclusion that Doms should have sought 
rescission of the Rossi Hills transaction before he purchased an interest in the Slipper parcel 
makes no sense and is clearly in error. 
Conclusion of Law 34 is a clear error of law which is the foundation for the trial court's 
denial of rescission and application of laches against Doms. In essence, the trial court ruled that 
Doms was bound to make his tender of rescission before he had any legal grounds to seek 
rescission. As already established in Point I. B above, the trial court's own pertinent Findings 
of Fact and the uncontradicted evidence show that Plaintiffs deceived Doms regarding the 
encroachments on Rossi Hills, and that Doms did not have knowledge that the loop road and 
7
 See, e ^ , Bailev v. CalL 767 P.2d 138 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 
(Utah 1989). 
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other encroachments constituted prescriptive easements or other legal encumbrances which would 
give him grounds to seek rescission until after the land survey of Rossi Hills was completed and 
Kinghorn had finished his investigation. Doms simply had no basis to seek rescission prior to 
Kinghorn's legal opinion, which was rendered as a result of the diligent efforts of Kinghorn and 
Doms. 
Conclusions of Law 35, 39 and 40 reiterate and compound the legal errors made by the 
trial court in Conclusions of Law 33 and 34. The critical question should have been whether 
Doms sought rescission within a reasonable time after his diligent efforts established that there 
were legal encumbrances on the property which would give him grounds to seek rescission. 
Furthermore, the trial court ignored this Court's decision in Breuer-Harrison, supra, that laches 
cannot be applied against a buyer who diligently attempts to develop the property around 
easements and thereby mitigate damages. 
In Conclusions of Law 36 through 38, the trial court made legal rulings regarding 
application of a decision by the Oregon Court of Appeals, Egeter v. West and North Properties. 
758 P.2d 361 (Ore. App. 1988). The decision in Egeter became an issue in the instant case 
because Plaintiffs had misrepresented the holding of Egeter in their trial brief (R. 4058). Doms 
pointed out on pages 22-24 of his "Trial Brief Regarding Issue of Laches" (R. 5122-24; Add. 22 
to Doms' op. br.), that the Egeter Court had actually affirmed the decision of the lower court 
rescinding a contract in a situation analogous to the facts of the instant case. The trial court in 
the instant case therefore attempted to distinguish Egeter in Conclusions of Law 36 through 38. 
However, the trial court's interpretation of Egeter is factually inaccurate and legally incorrect. 
Egeter clearly supports Doms' argument on appeal that the trial court should have rescinded the 
Rossi Hills transaction. 
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D. The Rossi Hills transaction was an executory, not an executed, contract because of 
Plaintiffs' breach of the covenants and warranties in the warranty deed. 
Plaintiffs make the erroneous argument in Point I. C of their response brief that the Rossi 
Hills transaction was an executed contract and that cases such as Breuer-Harrison. supra, and 
Bersstrom v. Moore. 677 P.2d 1123 (Utah 1984), are inapplicable because they involve executory 
real estate land contracts. Inexplicably, Plaintiffs cite language from the very Utah case which 
defeats their argument, Adams v. Reed. 40 P. 720 (Utah 1895), affirmed, Adams v. Henderson. 
168 U.S. 584 (1897). This is the seminal Utah case which establishes the precedent for Doms' 
right to rescission in the instant case. 
In Adams v. Reed, the Utah Supreme Court held that where there are title defects or an 
easement exists on the property to be conveyed, a warranty deed does not convey a fee simple 
as required by the covenants and warranties contained in the deed. 40 P. at 723-25. Thus, the 
Court held that where the sellers, who made only innocent or negligent misrepresentations, 
represented in the covenants and warranties of the warranty deed that they held fee simple title 
to the land, equity will treat the transaction as an executory contract to convey, and rescind the 
warranty deed, note and mortgage. Id. In so holding, the Court reasoned as follows: 
rwie are of the opinion that the facts in this case do not constitute an executed 
contract. The transaction between the parties, we think, evidences an executory 
contract, and that equity has power to decree a rescission. We are not determining 
what mala praxis is sufficient to entitle one to rescind an executed contract: for, 
as stated, the transaction in this case shows an executory contract, and we believe 
the rule to be well settled that material representations which are untrue, though 
innocently made, or the concealment of materials facts by mistake or inadvertence, 
when relied on and which have become the foundation of the active relations 
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between the parties, operate as a "surprise and imposition/' and constitute such 
fraud as will move a court of equity to decree a rescission of an executory 
contract. 
40 P. at 724-25 (emphasis added).8 
Furthermore, Plaintiffs completely ignore Adams v. Henderson, supra, in which the United 
States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Utah Supreme Court. The Henderson Court 
stated that because the railroad company had an easement on the property in question, "A court 
of equity could not compel the defendants to take and pay for land thus encumbered without 
making for the parties a contract which they did not choose to make for themselves." 168 U.S. 
at 587-88. Therefore, the Court held that the buyers were not bound to accept the warranty deed, 
the sellers could not convey the title they agreed to convey, the cash payments by the buyers 
were made upon the basis of a good and indefeasible title, and the buyers were entitled "to have 
a decree which, in effect, rescinds the contract, and gives them back what they paid." Id. at 588. 
The facts of the instant case are directly analogous to the facts in Adams. Like the sellers 
in Adams. Plaintiffs in the instant case breached the covenants and warranties in the warranty 
deed conveying Rossi Hills because there were defects in title to the property and the property 
was encumbered by easements. Thus, the Rossi Hills transaction constitutes an executory 
contract, not an executed contract, and is fully rescindable under Utah law. Moreover, the 
holdings in Breuer-Harrison and Bergstrom are a fortiori applicable to Doms' right to rescission 
in the instant case because an actual breach occurred in the instant case, rather than an 
anticipatory breach. 
8
 Adams v. Reed follows the general rule of law throughout the country that a contract 
remains executory until it has been fully performed according to its terms. See, e ^ , 15A 
Words and Phrases, Executed Contract, pp. 250-53 (perm, ed.); 17A Am. Jur.2d Contracts § 
6; 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 7. 
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It should also be pointed out that Plaintiffs have not cited a single Utah case which holds 
than an executed contract cannot be rescinded.9 The Idaho Supreme Court and, more recently, 
the Idaho Court of Appeals, have held that fully executed contracts may be rescinded. Lowe v. 
L m 646 P.2d 1030,1032 (Idaho App. 1982), citing Mohr v. Shultz. 388 P.2d 1002,1008 (Idaho 
1964). Lowe v. Lvm is cited with approval by the Utah Supreme Court in Spore v. Crested 
Butte Silver Mining. Inc.. 740 P.2d 1304, 1308 (Utah 1987). Respected authorities are also in 
agreement that executed contracts involving deeds, mortgages and deeds of trust can be rescinded 
on grounds other than fraud.10 
In regard to defects in Plaintiffs' title to Rossi Hills, Plaintiffs are mistaken in their 
assertion that the issue of boundary by acquiescence was not raised and argued before the trial 
court. In fact, in one of their several memoranda objecting to the trial court's Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, Plaintiffs argued that the lot encroachments on Rossi Hills were not 
legal and did not constitute a boundary line by acquiescence, and acknowledged that Poms had 
previously argued that these encroachments did constitute a boundary bv acquiescence (R. 458 L 
4585). Furthermore, Conclusions of Law 2, 3, 4 and 10 are not limited to only the covenant 
against encumbrances, and are clearly supported by Findings of Fact 11, 12 and 13, and the 
uncontradicted testimony of Ella and Elden Sorensen (see Point I. A of Doms' op. br.). 
9
 Exhaustive research by counsel for Doms has failed to locate a single Utah case 
holding that an executed contract cannot be rescinded. In fact, the Utah Supreme Court has 
rescinded transactions involving warranty deeds, notes and mortgages, without fraud as the 
basis for rescission. See, e.g.. Navlor v. Jensen. 113 P. 73 (Utah 1911); Rosenthyne v. 
Matthews-McCulloch Co.. 168 P. 957 (Utah 1917). 
10
 See, e ^ , 7 S. WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 926 (3d ed. 1963); 12A 
CJ.S. Cancellation of Instruments § 18; 8A G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN 
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 4465 (1963 repl). 
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A property owner acquires title to property under the doctrine of boundary by 
acqi iiescenc< ; \* I len the ft >llc • .viiig foi n factors are established: (1) occi ipatic >n up to a visible line 
marked by monuments, fences, or buildings; (2) mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary; 
(3) for a long period of time (usual!) 1:1 le commoi I la* prescriptive period of 20 yeai s); ai id (4) 
by adjoining land owners. Staker v. Ainsworth. 785 P.2d 417, 420 (Utah 1990). Findings of 
Fact 11-13, the uncontradicted testimony of the Sorensens, and the Alliance Engineering Survey 
(Ex. 77D), establish that Plaintiffs breached the covenant of general warranty of title when they 
conveyed Rossi Hills to Doms in March of 1982. 
E. The doctrine of merger has nothing to do with Doms1 right to rescission of the Rossi 
Hills transaction. 
Point I C of Plaintiffs' response brief argues that "rescission is not available because the 
cases which expound upon the doctrine of merger.11 This argument is another smoke screen 
deed, trust deed and trust deed note constitute a single contract or transaction (this issue is fully 
briefed in Point II, infra). The doctrine of merger has absolutely nothing to do with Poms' right 
to rescission in the instant case. Doms is seeking rescission based upon Plaintiffs' breach of the 
covenants ami warranties contained in the warranty deed itself, not in the earnest money 
agreement ui any nilm untcvedetit agrivmonl Plaintiffs* numerous ullici misitjpu*siinUiliuns ul 
material facts regarding Rossi Hills were also not terms of any antecedent agreement and did not 
it'lalt* in (IK; ilrliven nil litIc In Plaintiffs 'llicsc misrepresentations v ei c not extinguished 
11
 Plaintiffs cite Stubbs v. HemmerL 567 P.2d 168, 169 (Utah 1977); Embassy Group. 
Inc. v. Hatch. 227 Utah Adv. RpL 60, 61 (Utah App. 1993); Espinoza v. Safeco Title 
Insurance Co.. 598 P.2d 346 (Utah 1979). 
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merged into the warranty deed, but rather constitute an independent cause of action which also 
entitles Doms to rescission. 
F. The trial court's Judgment denying rescission should be reversed. 
In Papanikolas Bros. Enterprises v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Associates. 535 P.2d 
1256 (Utah 1975), the Utah Supreme Court stated the following: 
The existence of laches is one to be determined primarily by the trial court; and 
reviewing courts will not interfere with the exercise of the trial court's discretion 
in the matter, unless it appears that a manifest injustice has been done, or the 
decision cannot reasonably be found to be supported bv the evidence. In addition, 
a reasonable delay caused by an effort to settle a dispute does not invoke the 
doctrine of laches. 
535 P.2d at 1260 (footnotes omitted and emphasis added). 
In the instant case, the trial court's application of laches against Doms clearly "cannot 
reasonably be found to be supported by the evidence." The trial court's own Findings of Fact 
and the uncontradicted evidence preclude application of laches. The trial court's Conclusions of 
Law denying rescission are legally incorrect and not supported by the trial court's own Findings 
of Fact and the uncontradicted evidence. In addition, any alleged delay by Doms in seeking 
rescission was from his good faith efforts to work around the encumbrances and settle the 
dispute. 
Papanikolas also states that the propriety of a laches claim "is equally predicated upon the 
gravity of the prejudice suffered . . . and the length of . . . delay." 535 P.2d at 1260. In the 
instant case, no evidence of prejudice has ever been presented, and the trial court failed to enter 
any Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law that Plaintiffs suffered any prejudice. 
Finally, application of laches in favor of Plaintiffs and against Doms would indeed 
constitute a "manifest injustice." Plaintiffs deceived and duped Doms into purchasing Rossi 
Hills, frustrated every attempt by Doms to settle the dispute short of protracted litigation, and 
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have come into court seeking equitable relief when they have "unclean hands" and have acted 
in bad faith. 
Doms is entitled to rescission of the Rossi Hills transaction, and the Judgment of the trial 
Mnirl ikiniiiji icscisshin should In; icvtiNcd, 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY RULING THE WARRANTY DEED, 
TRUST DEED AND TRUST DEED NOTE DO NOT CONSTITUTE A SINGLE 
CONTRACT OR TRANSACTION, AND BY REFUSING TO RULE THAT DOMS 
WAS EXCUSED FROM PERFORMANCE AND NOT IN DEFAULT 
UNDER THE TRUST DEED AND TRUST DEED NOTE.12 
A. The warranty deed, trust deed and trust deed note constitute a single contract or 
transaction and must be construed together in determining the rights and obligations 
of the parties. 
i lie i olio wing Conclusions of I aw in regard to whether or not the 
warranty deed, trust deed and trust deed note constitute a single contract: 
6. The Warranty Deed, Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed prepared at the same 
do not constitute a single contract. 
7. The Court believes that the law applicable to this case is: The acceptance 
of the Deed completes the execution of the contract, and the Deed become [sic] 
final and conclusive evidence of the contract under which it is executed (84 A.L.R. 
1009). 
he Court concludes that the Utah case of Reese Howell Company v. 
Brown. 48 Utah 142, 158 P. 684, 689 (1916), sets forth the controlling law which 
must be applied in the instant case regarding the issue as to whether or not the 
Warranty Deed, Note and Trust Deed constitute a single contract 
9. The fact that a Trust Deed and Note were executed at the same time does 
not make them part of the contract to purchase the property. The Trust Deed and 
Note are documents executed to secure the payment of the property, and have no 
bearing upon whether the property is free and clear of encumbrances. 
12
 Almost all of the cases and authorities cited in Point II of both Doms' opening brief 
and this reply brief were submitted to the trial court, and are part of the record (see R. 4681-
4870). 
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Conclusions of Law 6, 7, 8 and 9 constitute clear errors of law by the trial court and must 
be reversed under the correction of legal error standard of review. Plaintiffs' argument in Point 
II of their response brief that the warranty deed constitutes a separate contract from the trust deed 
and trust deed note is a completely unsubstantiated and erroneous argument. Plaintiffs have 
never, either to the trial court or to this Court on appeal, presented a single case or authority in 
support of their argument. Plaintiffs manufactured this argument out of thin air, and it constitutes 
nothing more than another smoke screen and subterfuge. 
Inexplicably, Plaintiffs cite language from Bullfrog Marina. Inc. v. Lentz. 501 P.2d 266, 
271 (Utah 1972), which defeats the very argument advanced by Plaintiffs. The same language 
from Bullfrog Marina cited by Plaintiffs is cited by Doms on pages 30-31 of his opening brief. 
Plaintiffs' argument that the "same parties" were not involved in the warranty deed, trust deed 
and trust deed note is clearly without merit. The same parties were involved in all three of these 
documents: D.C. Anderson, Dan Scott, Doms and McCoy. The fact that the wives of Anderson 
and Scott also executed the warranty deed is irrelevant and has no bearing on construing the three 
documents as a single contract. Anderson and Scott could have included their wives as 
beneficiaries under the trust deed and trust deed note, or made them the sole beneficiaries, and 
this would still not change the nature of the Rossi Hills transaction as a single contract involving 
the three contract documents: the warranty deed, the trust deed and the trust deed note. Plaintiffs' 
argument that these three documents "do not concern the same subject matter" is ludicrous. All 
three documents are concerned with the Rossi Hills transaction, and all three documents must 
exist for the transaction to be completed. 
Plaintiffs are also clearly mistaken in their argument that the Utah case law set forth on 
pages 29-30 of Doms' opening brief does not establish that the three documents constitute a 
single contract. Plaintiffs fail to recognize that a trust deed or mortgage cannot exist without a 
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warranty deed or other deed of conveyance which first conveys the subject property to the buyer 
(the trustor or mortgagor). The trust deed or mortgage then creates u lien against tin; properly. 
In the instant case, the trustor (Doms) conveyed the legal title to the trustee by executing the trust 
deed, ami the irusttT hrld ili piopcih in 11 list Un tlu beneficiaries (llni it ills) lo sivuh" payment 
of the trust deed note. Doms would have had no legal title and nothing to convey to the trustee 
unless he had first received the warranty deed to Rossi Hills. 
Also, in the instant case, Plaintiffs filed an action to foreclose their trust a 
mortgage, which would operate to foreclose any right, title or interest of Doms to Rossi Hills. 
A foreclosure would operate upon all tlutee documents which constitute the contract between the 
parties: the note, the trust deed and the warranty deed. Plaintiffs could never foreclose without 
cancelling the warranty deed. Thus. Plaintiffs' argument would defeat their own action to 
foreclose in the instant case. 
Bvbee v. Stuart. 1H9 I ,2(1 ! 18 (Utah 1948), holds that a warranty deed and a contract to 
pay for the property constitute a formal mortgage:13 
Our statute . . . furnishes a form for real estate mortgages. However, it is not 
necessary that an instrument follow the statutory form to be a mortgage. No 
particular form is necessary so long as the intention of the parties is shown. Nor 
is it necessary that the mortgage be contained in one writing — it may consist of 
a warranty deed and a separate contract in writing, (citations omitted). 
The two instruments, taken together, constitute a formal mortgage, cognizable in 
a court of law. 
189 P.2d at 122 (emphasis added). 
Thus, il in tinu miitdei 1 lliilii Icnv iilli.iiil ii "ivttnatiU iJceti i* deemed lo lie part and parcel of 
a mortgage or trust deed. Together with the note, these documents constitute a single contract. 
13
 See also Brown v. Skeen. 58 P.2d 24, 32 (Utah 1936); Kiar v. Brimlev. 497 P.2d 
23, 25-26 (Utah 1972). Bvbee. Brown and Kjar are cited on pp. 29-30 of Doms' opening 
brief. 
This fact is made clear in First Savings Bank of Qgden v. Brown. 54 P.2d 237, 240-41 (Utah 
1936), which holds as follows: "The note and mortgage given at the same time, and as parts of 
the same transaction, must be construed together as constituting one contract. They supplement 
each other and express the entire contract between the parties." (emphasis added). 
The general rule of law throughout the country is also clearly in agreement with Utah law. 
For example, 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 156, sets forth the rule as follows: "Where a deed, lease, 
or other written instrument is incorporated in a mortgage by reference, or is given as part of the 
same transaction, the two instruments should be read and construed together, . . . " 
Another example is set forth in 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 388, which sets forth the 
general rule as follows: 
The general rule is that in the absence of anything to indicate a contrary 
intention, instruments executed at the same time, by the same contracting parties, 
for the same purpose, and in the course of the same transaction will be considered 
and construed together, since they are, in the eyes of the law, one contract or 
instrument. The rule applies even where the parties are not the same, if the 
several instruments were known to all the parties and were delivered at the same 
time to accomplish an agreed purpose. 
In essence, the Rossi Hills transaction is a classic bilateral contract. Plaintiffs executed 
the warranty deed in consideration for the execution of the trust deed and trust deed note by 
Doms and McCoy. Likewise, Doms and McCoy executed the trust deed and trust deed note in 
consideration for the execution of the warranty deed by Plaintiffs. 
B. Construction of the warranty deed, trust deed and trust deed note as a single 
contract is not affected by the doctrine of merger. 
In Conclusions of Law 7 and 8, the trial court specifically relied on an old A.L.R. article 
(84 A.L.R. 1009) and the old Utah case of Reese Howell Co. v. Brown. 158 P.2d 684, 689 (Utah 
1916), as the "controlling law" which allegedly demonstrate that the warranty deed, trust deed 
and trust deed note do not constitute a single contract. Reese Howell Co. and the cited A.L.R. 
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articles discuss the doctrine of merger and have absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with 
whether or not the warranty deed, trust deed and trust de< xi n< > t i i < :< mstitute a single cc >i ltract \s 
set forth in Reese Howell Co., and in more recent Utah case law,14 the doctrine of merger 
provides that the provisions of an antecedent agreement for the conveyance of real estate are 
generally merged into the deed of conveyance, and when the terms of the deed cover the same 
subject matter as the antecedent agreement, the deed controls. 
In the instant case, the trust deed and the trust deed note are not antecedent agreements 
which merge into the warranty deed, but rather are contemporaneous agreements which are 
construed together with the warrant) deed, as a single contract, iliis faei is clearly pointed out 
in the very A.L.R. article cited by the trial court in Conclusion of Law 7: 
A deed is a mere transfer of the title, a delivery so to speak of the subject-matter 
of the contract. It is the act of but one of the parties, made pursuant to a previous 
contract either in parol or in writing. It is not to be supposed that the whole 
contract between the parties is incorporated in the deed made by the grantor in 
pursuance of. or as the consummation of. a contract for the sale of land. There 
are many things pertaining to the contract which it is manifest are never inserted 
in a deed. 
Annotation, Merger of Contract in Deed. 84 A.L.R. 1008, 1009 (emphasis added). 
C. Poms was excused from performance and was never in default under the trust deed 
and trust deed note. 
In Point II, P of his opening brief, Doms cites extensive Utah Case law and other 
authority which clearly set forth the law that Doms was e^nised irom |K»rfnimaiiee ot (tie Rossi 
Hills contract because of Plaintiffs' breach of the covenants and warranties in the warranty deed, 
and Doms was therefore iievn en default untlci *lte HUM <ieed and trust deed note. 
14
 See, e.g.. Embassy Group Inc. v. Hatch. 221 Hielii AH - Rpi fiWiiJhili App 1993), 
and cases cited therein. 
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In their response brief. Plaintiffs do not cite a single Utah case or other authority to refute 
that Poms was excused from performance and was not in default. Rather, Plaintiffs simply 
restate and rely entirely on their previous erroneous arguments that the Rossi Hills transaction 
constitutes two separate executed contracts. Plaintiffs' argument regarding separate contracts is 
disposed of in subpoints A and B immediately above, and their argument regarding executed 
versus executory contracts is disposed of in subpoint I. D, supra. Doms submits that the reason 
Plaintiffs have failed to cite any authority in support of their arguments is that it simply does not 
exist. 
D. If rescission is denied, the Judgment of the trial court should be reversed and 
Judgment should be entered as set forth in Point II. E of Poms' opening brief. 
Point n. E of Poms' opening brief sets forth with particularity the Judgment that should 
be entered against Plaintiffs if this Court denies rescission of the Rossi Hills transaction. The 
only question involves the amount of damages which Poms should receive for Plaintiffs' breach 
of the covenants and warranties in the warranty deed, and this question is answered in Point HI, 
infra. 
In Point II. C of their response brief, Plaintiffs argue that Poms is not entitled to any set-
offs against the purchase price of Rossi Hills. Plaintiffs' argument is based entirely on the 
erroneous argument that the Rossi Hills transaction should be split into two separate contracts. 
Since this argument is totally without merit, Plaintiffs' argument against set-offs is equally 
without merit. Furthermore, any disputes that Plaintiffs may have amongst themselves in regard 
to who is responsible for payment of the Judgment are Plaintiffs' problems and must be resolved 
by actions for contribution or the like.15 In addition, Plaintiffs' argument fails to recognize that 
15
 See, e.g.. Federal Peposit Insurance Corp. v. Bismark Investment Corp.. 547 P.2d 
212, 214 (Utah 1976); Rule 69(h), U.R.C.P.; ILCA. §§ 15-4-1 through 7. 
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each of the four Plaintiffs is jointly and severely liable for the full amount of the Judgment 
because they all executed the warranty deed IUHI (INK became liable lor \\n> hn\u lies nl r|n> 
statutory covenants and warrants contained in the warranty deed. 
POINT III 
IF RESCISSION IS DENIED. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY 
AWARDING DOMS ONLY ONE-HALF THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES 
FOUND BY THE EXPERT APPRAISER. JERRY WEBBER. AS A 
RESULT OF THE ENCUMBRANCES ON ROSSI HILLS. 
1
 Doms is entitled to $166.050.00 in damages for the encumbrances on Rossi Hills, as 
determined bv the expert appraiser. Jerry Webber. 
Point III urnl 1 'loins' opcniti!' hricl seis torili wiili |Miiiuilurny line trial court's correct 
Conclusions of Law, and the applicable Utah law, for the proper measure of damages with all 
the em iiiitibniiiees in place and as they existed in March of 1982. Based upon application of the 
correct law, Doms has established that he should have been awarded $166,050.00 in damages 
found by the expert appraiser, Jerry Webber, because it represents the only determination based 
upon assumptions and conditions pern 
appraisal report of Plaintiffs' appraiser should have been disregarded because the determinations 
were based upon assumptions ami conditions not permitted by law. 
In Point HI. A of their response brief, Plaintiffs claim that Doms has no right to damages 
because he ' sold lilr property and received full consideration." This statement is false. Plaintiffs 
are referring to the transfer of Rossi Hills by Doms and McCoy to Dom it 
corporation. The property was not "sold" to Domcoy by Doms and McCoy. The uncontradicted 
evidence in the record establishes that Domrov iwul no n oiisalenilioiii w I hit sue i n in Doms or 
McCoy for the transfer (R. 7318). Rather, Doms and McCoy simply conveyed the property to 
their closely held < three-parcel development. Therefore, Plaintiffs7 
argument that Doms is not entitled to any damages "because this would be double recovery" is 
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clearly without merit. Likewise, Plaintiffs' assertion that Doms "abandoned all claims for 
damage" is absolutely false and utterly devoid of any support in the record. 
In Point HI. B of their response brief, Plaintiffs continue to make the untenable argument 
they make in Point VII of their opening brief: that is, the statutory covenant against 
encumbrances contained in the warranty deed should not cover apparent, irremediable 
encumbrances. The Utah Supreme Court has consistently ruled that the covenant against 
encumbrances protects against all known as well as unknown encumbrances.16 Plaintiffs' 
argument is inappropriate and must be rejected, as they are asking this Court to disregard the law 
as set forth by the Utah Supreme Court. 
On page 25 of their response brief, Plaintiffs make the baseless assertion that the trial 
court's determination of Doms' damages was speculative because "[n]o evidence was adduced to 
indicate what the value of the property would have been on the date of the sale to Doms and 
McCoy if the encumbrances were not in place." This statement is absolutely false. Webber 
specifically calculated the fair market value of Rossi Hills in March of 1982 without any 
encumbrances to be $276,750.00. (R. 7860-64; Ex. 88D). 
Plaintiffs' argument that Doms should be entitled to only one-half of any damages 
awarded by the trial court is also clearly without merit. Doms is the fee simple owner of Rossi 
Hills pursuant to the warranty deed from Domcoy to Doms dated August 26. 1988 (Ex. 17P: 
Add. 16 to Doms' op. br.). McCoy has no interest whatsoever in Rossi Hills, and in fact was not 
a party to the lawsuit after the default judgment was entered against him on January 20. 1988: 
and McCoy is not a party to this appeal. Plaintiffs' argument, in essence, amounts to a claim that 
they are entitled to a set-off against the default judgment entered against McCoy. This would 
16
 See, e ^ , Jones v. Grow Investment & Mortgage Co.. 358 P.2d 909, 911 (Utah 
1961); Bergstrom v. Moore. 677 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Utah 1984). 
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be clearly inequitable and result in the unjust enrichment of Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs are asking this 
Court to allow them a windfall as a result of their own breach el the onnuii ls of \\tuhmt\ wlim 
they sold the property. Equity simply cannot allow this to happen. 
In jililiiioii llunnm luvr -ami bonis pcisonull\ mi ilh1 mil .iiiiouiit purportedly due 
under the trust deed and trust deed note, claiming joint and several liability on the part of Doms 
vise, Plaintiffs are jointly and severely liable to Doms personally for the full 
amount of damages, or for the return of all money received by Plaintiffs if rescission is granted, 
because of Plaintiffs' breach of the covenants and warranties in the warranty deed. 
On page 26 of their response bi ief, Plaintiffs 4v 
evidence of the value of Rossi Hills as part of the three-parcel development, and therefore Doms' 
iLnii.igf;" cvidniiT should in disregiiulnl This argument is clearly without merit. The three-
parcel development was a speculative and potential development only, and never happened. It 
would have been clear error for the trial court to attempt to determine damages based upon a 
non-existent integrated development of Rossi Hills with other parcels of property. 
On page 27 of their response brief, Plaintiffs mistakenly rely on two Utah Supreme Court 
cases and a decision b> this Court foi the erroneoi is argumei • - methodology used by 
Webber has been expressly disapproved by the holdings in these cases.17 The Tedesco, Hansen 
and Thorscn cases sinipl> sel Uirtli ilir Km "'lu"i the market value of property must be determined 
by what a purchaser would be willing to pay for it in the condition that the propert) is iii, having 
in VILMIA the ()nirj>i)5e.s for which it is best adapted. This is exactly what Webber did in the instant 
case in determining the market value of Rossi Hills in March of 1982. both with and without the 
IT ^ State v. ledesco. 291 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Utah 1956); Utah Road Commission v. 
Hansen. 383 P.2d 917, 920 (Utah 1963); Thorsen v. Johnson, 796 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah App. 
1990). 
29 
encumbrances. The "fair market value" definition used by Webber in his appraisal is the 
definition used by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and used by most appraisal organizations 
(R. 7823; Ex. 88D, pp. 4-5). Webber utilized the direct sales comparison approach to estimate 
the value of Rossi Hills as vacant land, which involved direct comparisons of Rossi Hills to 
similar properties that sold in the Park City area in 1981 and 1982 (Ex. 88D, pp. 44-55). This 
is a standard methodology utilized by virtually all appraisers, and in fact is exactly the same 
methodology utilized by Pia, Plaintiffs' appraiser.18 
It should also be pointed out that the very cases relied upon by Plaintiffs on page 27 of 
their response brief conclusively establish that it would have been error for the trial court to 
measure damages based upon the non-existent, speculative three-parcel development.19 
On page 26 of their response brief, note 5, Plaintiffs make the patently false assertion that 
"it was established that the encumbrances could be relocated on appropriate request." Plaintiffs' 
citation to the record (R. 2616, 17) is an obviously inaccurate citation, as these pages of the 
record have nothing to do with the issue of whether the encumbrances could be relocated. On 
the contrary, Elden and Ella Sorensen testified that they would not sell their right to access to 
their property via the loop road (R. 7365), and Pia testified that Ella Sorensen told him she would 
not voluntarily remove her shed and fences (R. 8244). 
1
 In his appraisal report, Pia utilized the same definition of "fair market value" set 
forth by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board that Webber utilized in his appraisal report (Ex. 
9IP, p. 3). Pia also utilized the same methodology of direct sales comparisons in the Park 
City area for the years 1981 and 1982, which included many comparisons which were also 
utilized by Webber (Ex. 9IP, pp. 30-32). It is not the methodology utilized by Pia which 
renders his determinations of the value of Rossi Hills to be without merit, it is the fact that 
Pia's determinations are based on assumptions and conditions not permitted by law (see Doms' 
op. br., Point HI. E, pp. 40-42). 
19
 See note 17, supra. 
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B. I he valuations of Rossi Hills by Plaintiffs' appraiser should have been disregarded 
by the trial court because they were based on assumptions and conditions not 
permitted by law. 
IViinf III l.{ ol Doms' opening brief (pp. 40-42) sets forth with particularity the erroneous 
assumptions and conditions relied upon by Pia which were not permitted under I, Jtah law and/or 
Park City ordinances. In their response brief, Plaintiffs completely fail to address a single one 
of the 20 paragraphs; MI l< >nli in I )< nn< opening i virh the exception of the issue of whether 
one-half of McHenry Avenue could be used for development (which will be discussed, inlru). 
Rath mpt to use another smoke screen by inaccurately setting forth assertions not 
supported by the record, irrelevant pieces of evidence whicl 
valuation of Rossi Hills, and erroneous legal arguments regarding vacation of McHenry Avenue 
and the appraisal methodology utilized by both W ebbei and Pm, Plaintiffs' so-called evidence 
in support of the trial court's rulings regarding damages is set forth in the numbered paragraphs 
1 through II, (iJin pago ?8 "M n| iIn*n tesponse brief. 
In paragraph I, Plaintiffs argue that Doms suffered no damages because Wcbbei 
''admitted ' that the selling price of Rossi Hills could be the fair market value if a person offered 
to pay that much for it after having viewed the ennaadiiiir.its ilns assenir.ii .s incorrect and 
no! supported by Plaintiffs' citation to the record (R. 7882). An examination of the record reveals 
that this line of questioning b» • ,!;ji!viii"K was objected to by Doms and that Webber made no 
such admission as asserted by Plaintiffs (R. 7882-90). Webber's actual testimony was that the 
selling price might reflect the fair mai ket value if the buyer was aware of all of the easements 
and encumbrances, aware of all of the uses the property could be put to, and assumed that the 
seUer ^ * inlil take caic ul my problems because he delivered a warranty deed guaranteeing that 
there were no defects in title or encumbrances „ j I!" ,'"888 K1)), 
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In paragraph 2, Plaintiffs argue that Pia testified the fair market value of Rossi Hills in 
March of 1982 with the encumbrances was somewhere between $240,000.00 to $250,000.00, and 
that Pia used eight comparable sales and an appropriate methodology in determining fair market 
value. The problems with Pia's valuation of Rossi Hills have nothing to do with his methodology 
or the comparable sales utilized. In fact, as already point out, supra, both Pia and Webber 
utilized the same appraisal methodology and many of the same comparable sales. The problems 
with Pia's valuation, which Plaintiffs totally ignore and fail to respond to, are that he relied upon 
a 14-unit plan which could not be built in March of 1982, and which disregarded all of the 
encroachments and encumbrances on the property, including the loop road: and also which 
assumed that one-half of McHenry Avenue could be utilized for the development. 
In paragraph 3, Plaintiffs assert that Webber based his appraisal report on the use of 
McHenry Avenue as a means of access to Rossi Hills. Plaintiffs' citation to the record (R. 7900) 
was a response by Webber to a line of questions from Plaintiffs regarding potential access to the 
property and potential development of the property. Although Webber considered McHenry 
Avenue as a logical location for another access point to the property, the only access point 
actually utilized by Webber in arriving at his valuations of Rossi Hills was the existing access 
from the old railroad dugway (see F. of F. 7; Ex. 88D, p. 24). Any possible misunderstanding 
in regard to this issue was clarified by Webber's later testimony that his valuation of Rossi Hills, 
with all of the encumbrances in place in March of 1982 at $110,700.00, was not based in any 
way on the use of McHenry Avenue as access (R. 8197). 
In paragraphs 4 and 9, Plaintiffs erroneously argue that one-half of McHenry Avenue 
could be utilized for development of Rossi Hills, citing North Temple Investment Corp. v. Salt 
Lake Citv Corp., 489 P.2d 106 (Utah 1971). Plaintiffs' reliance on this case is misplaced, as the 
trial court correctly found and concluded that McHenry Avenue had not been vacated by Park 
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City or by a quiet title or other judicial determination, and therefore McHenry Avenue could not 
have been utilized as part of the development for Rossi Hills (F. of F. 16, 31, 32; C. of L. 17, 
18). North Temple Investment clearly stands for the proposition that it would take a quiet title 
action to acquire the right to use McHenry Avenue. Furthermore, in order to correctly rely on 
North Temple Investment. Plaintiffs would have to have introduced into evidence a certified copy 
of a plat of the Park City Survey showing this subdivision prior to 1890. 489 P.2d at 106-07. 
Plaintiffs' only evidence was a certified copy of a 1911 plat of the subdivision (Ex. 99P). Also, 
in North Temple Investment, none of the subdivision had ever been developed and none of the 
streets designated for public use had ever been developed or used by Salt Lake City or any other 
party. On the contrary, in the instant case, much of the subdivision in question had already been 
developed and many of the streets had been developed and dedicated by Park City and other 
parties. 
In paragraph 5, Plaintiffs erroneously argue that the methodology used by Webber in his 
appraisal of Rossi Hills was expressly disapproved by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. 
Tedesco. 291 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1956). This argument is clearly without merit, and has already 
been discussed in detail, supra. 
In paragraph 6, Plaintiffs' argue that Webber estimated the fair market value to be 
$166,000.00, based upon six residential units which could be developed on the property. 
Plaintiffs fail to point out that this valuation by Webber was based on an assumption that the 
loop road could be disregarded and a new access road constructed bordering the shed and fence 
encroachments on the western side of the property (R. 7864-66; Ex. 88D, p. 55). However, this 
scenario cannot be utilized to determine the damages because Utah law clearly requires that 
damages must be measured with all the encumbrances in place and as thev existed in March of 
1982 (see Point HI. B of Doms' op. br.; C. of L. 14). The only relevant evidence introduced was 
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Webber's valuation of $110,700.00, which was based upon a maximum of four residential units 
because of the encroachments and encumbrances on the property. 
In paragraph 7, Plaintiffs' argument that Doms withdrew his cause of action for loss of 
profits is completely irrelevant to the proper measure of damages, which is the value of the 
property without any encumbrances minus the value with the encumbrances in March 1982. 
In paragraph 8, Plaintiffs make another totally irrelevant argument regarding zoning 
ordinances which had not been adopted by Park City in March of 1982. This argument is simply 
another smoke screen and subterfuge by Plaintiffs in regard to the damages issue. 
In paragraph 9, Plaintiffs simply continue their erroneous argument regarding the 
availability of McHenry Avenue for development of the property. 
In paragraph 10, Plaintiffs make another totally irrelevant argument regarding appraisal 
of the value of Rossi Hills in August of 1983. This is simply another attempt by Plaintiffs to 
divert attention from the only relevant date for determining the value of Rossi Hills, March of 
1982. 
In paragraph 11, Plaintiffs argue that it is unclear whether Webber's appraisal was based 
on a Park City ordinance in effect in 1982 which prohibited building on a slope greater than 30% 
in an HR-1 zone, which did not apply to Rossi Hills. Webber clarified this point by directly 
testifying that the fact that there was no such ordinance applicable to Rossi Hills did not affect 
his opinions or conclusions regarding the value of the property (R. 8201). 
C. The trial court should have excluded Exhibits 91P and 98P, and disregarded the 
testimony of Pia and Deckert in regard to these exhibits. 
Point HI. D of Doms' opening brief sets forth with particularity the reasons why the trial 
court should have excluded Exhibits 9IP and 98P, and disregarded the testimony of Pia and 
Deckert in regard to these exhibits, as a sanction against Plaintiffs for violating discovery rules. 
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Doms had a continuing and specific request for the production of all documents intended to be 
introduced at trial by Plaintiffs (see Add. 25 to Doms' op. br.). Exhibit 91P is Pia's final 
appraisal report, and Exhibit 98P is Deckert's 14-unit proposal for Rossi Hills. 
It is clear from the facts and testimony set forth on pages 38-39 of Poms' opening brief 
that Plaintiffs deliberately failed to provide Exhibits 9IP and 98P to Doms prior to trial. 
Plaintiffs disregarded the rules of discovery and attempted to conduct a trial by ambush. 
Plaintiffs clearly acted in bad faith and should have been sanctioned by the trial court. 
Plaintiffs argue in Point HI. D of their response brief that Doms has not demonstrated how 
his substantial rights were affected by the admission of this evidence. This argument is clearly 
without merit, as these two exhibits and the testimony of Pia and Deckert in regard to them 
constituted a substantial part of Plaintiffs' case regarding the issue of damages suffered by Doms 
as a result of the encumbrances on Rossi Hills. 
Plaintiffs go on to make the unmeritorious argument that Doms could have scheduled Pia's 
deposition and declined to do so. This argument ignores Plaintiffs' deliberate violation of 
discovery rules and begs the question regarding sanctions by the trial court. Doms was under 
no obligation to take Pia's deposition, and had every reason and right to believe that he had 
already received Pia's appraisal report and any other documents intended to be introduced by 
Plaintiffs at trial. The trial court allowed Doms no additional time to prepare for Deckert's 
testimony in regard to Exhibit 98P, and allowed Doms only one night in between trial days to 
prepare for Pia's testimony in regard to Exhibit 9IP. 
Plaintiffs mistakenly rely on this Court's decision in Berrett v. Denver & Rio Grande 
W.R.. 830 P.2d 291,296 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). In Berrett. 
the trial court excluded some of plaintiffs' witnesses from testifying because they were not on 
plaintiffs' final witness list. The majority opinion in Berrett held that "absent an order creating 
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a judicially imposed deadline, a trial court may not sanction a party by excluding its witnesses 
under rule 37(b)(2)." 830 P.2d at 296. However, Judge Jackson's dissent points out that the trial 
court never used Rule 37(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as a justification for excluding 
the witnesses, and that it is just as conceivable that the trial court decided to exclude the 
witnesses because plaintiffs had proceeded in bad faith in preparing for trial. 830 P.2d at 298. 
Likewise, in the instant case, Plaintiffs should have been sanctioned for their bad faith and 
not because of any particular violation of Rule 37(b). Moreover, in the instant case, it would not 
have been necessary to exclude the entire testimony of Pia and Deckert. Rather, Pia and Deckert 
should have been allowed to testify, but Exhibits 9IP and 98P should have been excluded and 
Pia and Deckert should not have been allowed to testify in regard to these two exhibits. This 
would have been an appropriate sanction by the trial court, and would not have run afoul of the 
majority decision in Berrett. 
D. If rescission is denied, the Judgment of the trial court should be reversed and 
remanded with directions to enter Judgment that Poms suffered $166.050,00 in 
damages as a result of the encumbrances on Rossi Hills. 
In Gillmor v. Gillmor. 745 P.2d 461 (Utah App. 1987), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 
1988), this Court held that there must be a "reasonable basis in the evidence" to affirm a trial 
court's award of damages. 745 P.2d at 462. In the instant case, the trial court arbitrarily cut the 
amount of damages found by Webber in half, and ruled that Doms had suffered $83,000.00 in 
damages rather than $166,050.00 (C. of L. 19; Judg. 11 4). The trial court improperly considered 
the inappropriate, irrelevant valuations of Rossi Hills by Pia (F. of F. 29), which should have 
been completely disregarded because Pia's opinions were based on assumptions and conditions 
not permitted by law. Therefore, the trial court's award of damages should be reversed because 
there is no reasonable basis in the evidence to support it. 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY RULING THAT POMS' COUNTERCLAIM 
AGAINST THE ESTATE OF D.C. ANDERSON. AS IT RELATES TO THE 
REMEDY OF DAMAGES. IS TIME-BARRED BY THE PROBATE "NONCLAIM" 
PROVISIONS OF U.C.A. S§ 75-3-801 AND 75-3-803. 
A. Poms' causes of action against the Estate of D.C. Anderson are not "claims" under 
the Uniform Probate Code, and therefore need not have been filed against the estate. 
Point IV. A of Doms' opening brief sets forth the law in Utah, as well as several other 
states with similar probate "nonclaim" statutes, that Doms' causes of action against Plaintiffs are 
not "claims" which were required to be filed against the Estate of D.C. Anderson under the Utah 
Uniform Probate Code. Utah case law is clear that a "claim," as defined in the Uniform Probate 
Code, only "refers to debts or demands against the decedent which might have been enforced in 
his lifetime, bv personal actions for the recovery of money; and upon which only a money 
judgment could have been rendered." In re Estate of Sharp. 537 R2d 1034, 1037 (Utah 1975) 
(emphasis added). Thus, the Sharp Court held that a claim for specific performance, which is 
an equitable claim, is not a creditor's claim subject to the time limitations for filing a "claim" 
against an estate. Id. 
In Point IV of their response brief, Plaintiffs erroneously suggest that the holding in Sharp 
should be limited to claims for specific performance, since no Utah appellate court has had 
occasion to issue a direct ruling on other equitable claims such as rescission. Plaintiffs have 
attempted to set forth a narrow interpretation of the holding in Sharp which was clearly never 
intended by the Utah Supreme Court. Any cause of action which does not fall within the 
definition of a "claim" under the probate statutes, as defined by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Sharp, is not a "claim" and need not filed against an estate. There is no language in Sharp or 
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subsequent Utah case law which suggests that only an equitable claim for specific performance 
need not be filed against an estate. 
Other states with similar probate nonclaim statutes have not limited equitable claims to 
claims for specific performance. For example, in Reed v. Sixth Judicial District Court, 341 P.2d 
100 (Nev. 1959), the sole question presented for review was whether a claim for rescission and 
restitution is a "claim" under the probate nonclaim statute. 341 P.2d at 101. The executrix of 
the decedent's estate argued that a claim for rescission and restitution is a general money demand 
against the estate, and as such is barred by the nonclaim statute. Id. The Reed Court rejected 
this argument, and held that the rescission claim was not a claim against the property constituting 
the estate and need not have been filed under the nonclaim statute. Id. 
Another example is provided by the case of Bank of California v. Connolly, 111 Cal. Rpt. 
468 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1973), in which the Court defined "claim" under California's probate code 
exactly the same, word for word, as the Utah Supreme Court defined "claim" in Sharp, supra. 
I l l Cal. Rpt. at 482. Other states have also adopted this same definition, as it is apparent that 
this definition is uniformally recognized under many state probate codes. In Bank of California, 
the Court pointed out that since there was no indebtedness under a profit sharing agreement 
during the decedent's lifetime, the other parties to the agreement were not required to file 
creditor's claims against the estate under the nonclaim statute. 111 Cal. Rpt. at 482. 
In the instant case, Doms sought rescission of the Rossi Hills transaction, which is clearly 
not a "claim" under the provisions of the Utah Uniform Probate Code. Plaintiffs erroneously 
argue that for a cause of action to fall outside the nonclaim statute, it must be "purely equitable" 
and one for which only equitable relief can be obtained. This limitation has never been adopted 
bv the Utah Supreme Court and does not represent the law in Utah. However, even assuming, 
arguendo, that this definition should be applied, Doms was still not required to file his causes 
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of action against the estate. Doms' claims against Plaintiffs have always been "purely equitable" 
claims for rescission and restitution. The trial court's refusal to grant these claims forced Doms 
to seek his alternative remedy of damages, but did not change the equitable nature of Doms' 
rescission action. 
Doms simply has never been a "creditor" of the Estate of D.C. Anderson. In order for 
Doms to be considered a creditor. D.C. Anderson must have owed a debt to Doms which could 
have been enforced during Anderson's lifetime, and upon which only a money judgment could 
have been rendered. Sharp, supra, at 537 P.2d 1037. 
B. Notwithstanding a ruling that Doms' remedy of damages is subject to the nonclaim 
statute. Doms is still entitled to a set-off for the damages against the purchase price 
of Rossi Hills. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that Doms was required to somehow file a damages claim 
against th$ Estate of D.C. Anderson under the probate nonclaim statutes, Doms is still entitled 
to a set-off against the purchase price of Rossi Hills for all such damages. In Point IV of their 
response brief, Plaintiffs reiterate the same erroneous arguments they make in Point n. C of their 
response brief. Doms has already clearly shown that Plaintiffs' arguments are without merit (see 
Point II. D of this reply brief, supra: Point IV. B of Doms' opening brief). 
C. The general policies and purposes underlying the Utah Uniform Probate Code are 
irrelevant to a resolution of the issue now before this Court. 
Plaintiffs, in another attempt to set up a smoke screen and divert this Court's attention 
from the real issue, cite two decisions by this Court which make statements regarding the general 
purposes and policies of the Utah Uniform Probate Code.20 Although the general policies and 
purpose underlying the probate code are important, they simply have no relevance to a 
20
 Plaintiffs cite Dementas v. Estate of Tallas. 764 P.2d 628, 630 (Utah App. 1988); 
Ouinn v. Ouinn. 772 P.2d 979, 981 (Utah App. 1989). 
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determination of the issue before this Court. The only issue before this Court is whether or not 
Doms' remedy of damages constitutes a "claim" which had to be filed against the Estate of D.C. 
Anderson within the three-month filing limitation of the nonclaim statutes. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO AWARD 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND APPROPRIATE COSTS TO POMS. 
A. Doms is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs for sustaining 
his title to Rossi Hills against Plaintiffs' foreclosure and quiet title actions. 
Point V. A of Doms' opening brief sets forth Utah law which entitles Doms to an award 
of reasonable attorney's fees and costs for having to sustain his title to Rossi Hills against 
Plaintiffs' foreclosure action in the main case (Civil No. 8339) and quiet title action in the tax 
sale case (Civil No. 10066).21 In Point V of their response brief, Plaintiffs erroneously claim that 
this argument is raised for the first time on appeal. Plaintiffs are clearly mistaken. The issue 
of Doms' right to attorney's fees and costs for having to defend against Plaintiffs' foreclosure and 
quiet title actions was argued orally before the trial court on several occasions. In fact, the trial 
court made a legal ruling specifically in regard to this issue, which is mistakenly set forth as a 
Finding of Fact (see F. of F. 55). 
Plaintiffs further argue that their foreclosure action does not attack Doms' title to Rossi 
Hills. Plaintiffs' argument is clearly in error, as they have misunderstood the nature and purpose 
of a foreclosure action. A successful foreclosure action would not simply result in the 
foreclosure of the trust deed and trust deed note as alleged by Plaintiffs, but rather would result 
in the foreclosure of all right, title and interest of Doms to Rossi Hills. Plaintiffs' foreclosure 
action therefore clearly assails and disputes the title of Doms. 
21
 See Forrer v. Sather. 595 P.2d 1306, 1308 (Utah 1979); Van Cott v. Jacklin. 226 P. 
460, 463 (Utah 1924). 
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Plaintiffs also erroneously argue that the tax sale case did not assail or dispute Doms' title 
to Rossi Hills. This is not a good faith argument, since Count 2 of the tax sale case was an 
action to quiet title to Rossi Hills in the Plaintiffs, as against Doms and all other possible 
claimants. Plaintiffs' quiet title action was clearly an attack on Doms' title to Rossi Hills. 
Plaintiffs next make the erroneous argument that Doms is not entitled to attorney's fees 
or costs for Plaintiffs' breach of the general warranty of title or quiet enjoyment of Rossi Hills, 
based upon Plaintiffs' mistaken assertion that "title" was not an issue and Doms did not try to 
establish that the abutting property owners had title to any part of Rossi Hills by virtue of the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. This argument has already been shown to be without 
merit in Point I. D. of this reply brief, supra. 
Plaintiffs mistakenly rely on Espinoza v. Safeco Title Insurance Co.. 598 P.2d 346, 348 
(Utah 1979), as the trial court likewise mistakenly relied on George A. Lowe Co. v. Simmons 
Warehouse Co.. 39 Utah 395, 117 P. 874 (1911) (see F. of R 55). These two cases simply hold 
that the grantee is not entitled to attorney's fees in an action directly against the grantor for 
breach of the covenant against encumbrances. However, in the instant case, Doms is entitled to 
attorney's fees and costs because Plaintiffs' foreclosure and quiet title actions are separate actions 
which entitle Doms to attorney's fees and costs. The fact that Plaintiffs themselves, rather than 
a third party, have attacked Doms' title makes Doms' right to attorney's fees and costs a fortiori. 
B. Doms is entitled to an award of his out-of-pocket attorney's fees as consequential 
damages flowing from Plaintiffs' breach of contract. 
Point V. B of Doms' opening brief argues that Doms is entitled to his out-of-pocket 
attorney's fees as consequential damages under the rationale of Canyon Country Store v. Bracev. 
781 P.2d 414,420 (Utah 1989). Doms acknowledges that this Court's recent decision in Collier 
v. Heinz. 827 P.2d 982 (Utah App. 1992), holds that Bracev is only applicable to insurance 
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contract cases. Doms respectfully submits that Collier is in error on this particular issue. Doms 
is preserving this issue for potential review by the Utah Supreme Court on petition for writ of 
certiorari. 
C. Doms is entitled to an award of appropriate costs, including costs of depositions. 
On page of 42 of their response brief, Plaintiffs argue that Doms is not entitled to any 
further award of costs because he is not the prevailing party on any of his causes of action in his 
Second Amended Counterclaim. This argument was incessantly made by Plaintiffs to the trial 
court, and is not made in good faith. Doms' first cause of action in his Counterclaim is for 
Plaintiffs' breach of the covenants and warranties in the warranty deed, and the remedy sought 
by Doms is rescission or, in the alternative, damages. Although the trial court denied Doms' 
remedy of rescission, the trial court entered Conclusions of Law stating that Doms' remedy is for 
breach of the statutory covenants of warranty in the warranty deed, and that Doms suffered 
$83,000.00 as a result of said breach by Plaintiffs (see C. of L. 10,19). Plaintiffs are well aware 
of this fact, and their argument in regard to this issue is simply not made in good faith. 
As discussed in Point V. E of Doms' opening brief, the trial court awarded Doms the 
paltry amount of $101.50 in costs, and did not award any costs for the depositions of Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs argue on page 42 of their response brief that "it does not appear that any of the 
depositions Doms took were utilized by Doms at the time of trial." This statement is false. The 
depositions of Dan Scott (R. 2724), Jeanne Scott (R. 2725), and Ellen Anderson (R. 2726) were 
utilized at trial and were absolutely necessary to establish facts proving that the word "special" 
was not typed on the warranty deed when it was executed and deUvered by Plaintiffs; and facts 
regarding Plaintiffs' knowledge of the encroachments on Rossi Hills and their failure to attempt 
to remedy them or otherwise mitigate damages (see F. of F. 4, 14, 15, 16). These depositions 
were essential for the development of Doms' case, and should be taxable as costs. 
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POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS AWARD OF 
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS TO PLAINTIFFS. 
A. Plaintiffs are not entitled to any attorney's fees or costs incurred in Civil No. 8339. 
the main case. 
Point VI. A of Doms' opening brief sets forth clear Utah law which establishes that 
Plaintiffs have absolutely no legal basis whatsoever to claim an award of attorney's fees or costs 
in the instant case. 
In Point VI. A of their response brief, Plaintiffs inaccurately assert that Doms 
"acknowledges'' Plaintiffs' right to attorney's fees and costs if Doms was in default under the trust 
deed and trust deed note. Plaintiffs must not have read Point VI. A of Doms' opening brief. On 
page 51. Doms sets forth three consistent decisions by the Utah Supreme Court which clearly 
establish that even if Doms were determined to be in default under the trust deed and trust deed 
note. Plaintiffs still would not be entitled to recover any attorney's fees or costs for defending 
against the causes of action in Doms' Counterclaim, even if Plaintiffs were successful in 
foreclosing against Rossi Hills.22 In their response brief, Plaintiffs have misrepresented the 
holding of the Utah Supreme Court in Stubbs. The Stubbs Court held that a vendor who 
successfully brought a foreclosure action against the purchasers could not recover attorney's fees 
incurred in defending against a counterclaim, especially where the defense was unsuccessful. 567 
P.2d at 171. 
Any doubt as to the holding in Stubbs was dispelled in the subsequent decisions of Utah 
Farm Production Credit Ass'n v. Cox and Trayner v. Cushing. supra. In Cox, the Utah Supreme 
22
 See Travner v. Cushing. 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984); Utah Farm Production 
Credit Ass'n v. Cox. 627 P.2d 62, 66 (Utah 1981); Stubbs v. HemmerL 567 P.2d 168, 171 
(Utah 1977). 
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Court directly held as follows: "In the case of Stubbs v. Hemmert, this Court ruled that the 
plaintiff was not entitled to reimbursement for fees he had incurred in defending a counterclaim 
in a foreclosure action." 626 P.2d at 66. This interpretation of the rule enunciated in Stubbs was 
subsequently reiterated in Travner. 688 P.2d at 858, note 6. 
Plaintiffs next make the argument that they are entitled to attorney's fees based upon Dixie 
State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988). This argument is based upon the false 
assertion that Doms was unsuccessful on his Second Amended Counterclaim, and the 
unbelievable assertion that "Doms has been stubbornly litigious in the instant case, just as the 
defendants were in Dixie State Bank." Plaintiffs' assertion that Doms has been "stubbornly 
litigious" is false. Beginning in the summer of 1988, after the default judgment against Doms 
was set aside, Plaintiffs buried the trial court and Doms in an avalanche of paper for over four 
years. This Court can have its staff review the record and make its own determination as to 
which side has been "stubbornly litigious." 
Plaintiffs' comparison of Doms' conduct to that of the defendants in Dixie State Bank is 
not a good faith argument. In that case, the defendants attempted to take advantage of a bank 
computer error by not making payments on a bank loan for a truck they had purchased. When 
the bank discovered the error, the defendants refused to make all of the required payments, and 
the bank repossessed the truck and sold it at private sale pursuant to published notice. The 
defendants were high bidders at the sale and bought their truck back, leaving a substantial 
deficiency. The defendants refused to pay the deficiency, and the bank was forced to commence 
an action to recover the balance still owing on the loan. The bank also sought an award of 
attorney's fees based upon provisions in the original note and security agreement. 764 P.2d at 
986. 
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The defendants filed numerous frivolous motions to dismiss, and a frivolous counterclaim 
demanding, among other things, punitive damages against the bank of at least $200,000.00. 
Numerous depositions were noticed up and taken and extensive discovery was completed by the 
parties. Id. at 986-87. 
Shortly before trial, the defendants entered into a stipulation and settlement with the bank, 
which entitled the bank to judgment in the full amount owing on the loan plus attorney's fees in 
an amount found reasonable by the court, and the defendants' counterclaim was dismissed in its 
entirety. Id. at 987. 
It is readily apparent that the conduct of the defendants in Dixie State Bank cannot in 
good faith be compared to the conduct of Doms in the instant case. Plaintiffs have 
misrepresented the decision in Dixie State Bank as "authority" for an attorney's fees award to 
Plaintiffs in the instant case. On the contrary, Dixie State Bank provides no authority whatsoever 
for such an award to Plaintiffs. 
Doms points out on page 51 of his opening brief that "Plaintiffs' counsel either admitted 
in their affidavits or in their testimony at the hearing on attorney's fees that all of their requested 
fees were incurred defending against Doms' Second Amended Counterclaim in the main case." 
Although this statement is followed by extensive citations to exhibits and testimony in the record, 
Plaintiffs assert on page 47 of their response brief that this statement "is absolutely false!" 
Plaintiffs are mistaken in their bold assertion. Pages 10-14 of Mcintosh's attorney's fee affidavit 
establish that none of Mcintosh's billings to his clients reflect services rendered in regard to 
prosecuting the foreclosure action (Attorney's Fees Ex. 3P; R. 5903-07). Mcintosh also testified 
that he was contacted by Biele to represent Ellen Anderson and Jeanne Scott personally because 
they were brought into the case by Doms' Second Amended Counterclaim and that he then 
represented them in defending against the Counterclaim (R. 6418). Mcintosh further admitted 
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under cross-examination that none of his billings differentiate which fees were expended on the 
foreclosure action versus fees expended in defense of the Counterclaim (R. 6433). 
Furthermore, none of the attorney's fees set forth in Biele's affidavit were expended in 
prosecution of the foreclosure complaint (Attorney's Fees Ex. 5P). Biele admitted under cross-
examination that all of the amounts claimed as attorney's fees in his affidavit were in defense of 
Doms' Second Amended Counterclaim (R. 6383-84). 
B. Plaintiffs are not entitled to any attorney's fees or costs incurred in Civil No. 10066, 
the tax sale case. 
Point VI. B of Doms' opening brief establishes the reasons why Plaintiffs are not entitled 
to any attorney's fees or costs in the tax sale case. As in the main case, Plaintiffs' only possible 
claim for attorney's fees and costs in the tax sale case is based upon an alleged default by Doms 
under the trust deed and trust deed note. Since Doms was never in such default, Plaintiffs have 
absolutely no legal basis to claim attorney's fees or costs. Doms further points out in his opening 
brief that it was unconscionable for Plaintiffs to even request attorney's fees and costs in regard 
to the tax sale case, and that the only party who could possibly be held responsible for the 
alleged attorney's fees incurred by Plaintiffs in the tax sale case would be Summit County, not 
Doms. 
In truth, the tax sale case was a completely frivolous and unnecessary lawsuit filed by 
Plaintiffs to attempt to prevent Doms from rescinding the Rossi Hills transaction and to cloud 
Doms' title; to needlessly run up the cost of the litigation and to harass Doms; and to complicate 
and delay the issues in the main case. Plaintiffs attempt to justify the tax sale case by claiming 
that their trust deed was extinguished at the Summit County tax sale under the rationale of 
Hanson v. Bums. 46 P.2d 400 (Utah 1935), affirmed, Ingrahm v. Hanson. 297 U.S. 378 (1936). 
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The general rule enunciated in Hanson is that all liens against property sold at tax sale 
are extinguished if the property is purchased by a third-party bona fide purchaser. However, the 
Utah Supreme Court has long recognized an exception to this general rule. In Tuft v. Federal 
Leasing. 657 P.2d 1300, 1303 (Utah 1982), citing its previous decision in Hadlock v. Benjamin 
Drainage District. 53 P.2d 1156 (Utah 1936), the Court stated that the law is well-settled that 
"one who is under a duty to pay taxes cannot add to or strengthen his title by purchasing the land 
at tax sale."23 The Tuft Court further held that when looking at a tax sale, one must "look at the 
substance of the transaction rather than its form." 657 P.2d at 1303. The Court ultimately held 
that the "so-called purchase at tax sale . . . constituted nothing more than payment of the taxes, 
or a redemption by the owners. As a necessary consequence, plaintiffs' interest in the property 
was not defeated bv the tax sale." (footnote omitted and emphasis added). Id. 
This is similar to what happened in the instant case. Doms "purchased" the property sold 
at the tax sale to Summit County in 1987 by paying all of the delinquent taxes, interest, penalties, 
costs and the 1988 estimated taxes. The Utah Supreme Court has made it clear that this type of 
"purchase" actually constitutes a "redemption" of the property. See Salt Lake Home Builders. 
Inc. v. Colman. 518 P.2d 165 (Utah 1974). 
Therefore, under clear Utah law, Plaintiffs' trust deed was not extinguished by the tax sale 
and subsequent redemption by Doms, and Plaintiffs had a valid lien against Rossi Hills at the 
time they filed the tax sale case. Under Utah law, Doms could not strengthen his title and 
extinguish the security interest of Plaintiffs by redeeming the property from Summit County. 
Counsel for Doms pointed this out to counsel for Plaintiffs on several occasions, even prior to 
December of 1988 when Plaintiffs filed the tax sale case (R. 6537-38). Nevertheless, Plaintiffs 
23
 See also Dillman v. Foster- 656 P.2d 974 (Utah 1982); Crofts v. Johnson. 313 P.2d 
808 (Utah 1957); Free v. Farnwortk 144 P.2d 532 (Utah 1943). 
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filed the tax sale case for the inappropriate reasons set forth above, claiming that the tax sale was 
unconstitutional. 
Plaintiffs' assertions in Point VL B of their response brief that Doms "resisted every effort 
to stipulate that the sale could be set aside" and that "Doms required Plaintiffs to conduct 
extensive discovery" are absolutely false. At no time did Plaintiffs ever request Doms to enter 
into a stipulation to set aside the tax sale. Rather, Plaintiffs steadfastly argued that the tax sale 
was unconstitutional and continued conducting full discovery. Plaintiffs continued to argue 
against their own interest for several years by claiming that they had lost their lien against Rossi 
Hills when Doms was willing to concede all along that Plaintiffs had not lost their hen. The only 
reason Plaintiffs took this course of action was so they could file the frivolous, unmeritorious tax 
sale case in an attempt to stop rescission of the Rossi Hills transaction. It would simply be 
unconscionable to award Plaintiffs any attorney's fees or costs for any expense incurred in the 
tax sale case. 
C. Plaintiffs are not entitled to any attorney's fees or costs incurred in their two 
Petitions to the Utah Supreme Court. 
Subpoints C and D of Point VI of Doms' opening brief clearly establish that the trial court 
erred in awarding any attorney's fees or costs to Plaintiffs for their Petitions for an Interlocutory 
Appeal and for an Extraordinary Writ to the Utah Supreme Court. Plaintiffs lost on both of these 
petitions and cannot make a legitimate claim for attorney's fees or costs. In their response brief, 
Plaintiffs have not even attempted to justify the attorney's fee awards made by the trial court for 
Plaintiffs' two petitions to the Utah Supreme Court. Doms submits that there is no justification 
for these awards by the trial court, and the trial court committed clear legal error in making these 
awards. 
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D. Plaintiffs are not entitled to any attorney's fees or costs pursuant to their motions for 
sanctions in regard to Poms' objections to discovery requests. 
Point VI. E of Doms' opening brief sets forth with particularity the reasons why Plaintiffs 
are not entitled to any attorney's fees or costs pursuant to their motions for sanctions in regard 
to their discovery requests. In Point VI. C of their response brief, Plaintiffs argue that they are 
entitled to all of their claimed attorney's fees in regard to their discovery requests because of 
"[t]he frivolous grounds for the objections and the stubbornness of Doms in refusing to respond 
to these legitimate discovery requests." 
Plaintiffs' assertions are erroneous and belie the actual facts. Many of Plaintiffs' requests 
were not "legitimate." Consequently, Doms made full or partial objections to these requests on 
the grounds they were not relevant to the subject matter of the pending action; not reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; and they constituted harassment, 
annoyance, oppression, and would create an undue burden or expense.24 
Plaintiffs further argue in their response brief that "Doms filed a flurry of frivolous 
motions disagreeing with Judge Frederick on every point and requesting an inordinate amount 
of relief." This is another baseless, false and self-serving statement by Plaintiffs. These so-called 
"frivolous motions" are set forth on page of 57 of Doms' opening brief, and this Court is invited 
to examine and compare them to Plaintiffs' accusations. These motions were legitimate and well-
founded in both law and fact. 
24
 The Court is referred to Doms' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Sanctions, dated May 6, 1989 (R. 1574-1674), for a thorough discussion of the inappropriate 
and improper discovery requests made by Plaintiffs. 
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E. Doms is entitled to a refund of a substantial amount of the attorney's fees and costs 
paid to Plaintiffs as a condition of the trial court setting aside the default judgment. 
Point VI. F of Doms' opening brief sets forth the facts and the law which establish that 
Doms is entitled to a substantial refund of the $4,467.60 he paid to Plaintiffs as a condition of 
the trial court setting aside the default judgment. Plaintiffs have not responded to this issue in 
their response brief. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the arguments set forth in this reply brief, and upon the arguments set forth 
in Doms' opening brief, Doms requests that this Court reverse the Judgment of the trial court and 
grant the relief requested in the Conclusion of Doms' opening brief, set forth on pages 74-75 of 
said brief. 
DATED this **£> day of May, 1994. 
CRAIG J2T BOORMAN 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee and 
Cross-Appellant Eugene E. Doms 
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